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I. Introduction	
On‐going	discussions	on	food	security	as	both	an	element	of	the	right	to	food	and	a	goal	
for	 agricultural	 policy	 focus	 on	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 respective	 rights	 holders	 and	 the	
corresponding	 duty‐bearers,	 i.e.	 individuals	 and	 the	 state.	 Yet,	 the	 coincidence	 of	 the	
recent	 food	 crisis	 and	 the	 financial	 crisis	 revealed	 a	 substantial	 analytical	 lack	 in	
addressing	the	impact	of	the	business	sector	on	food	security.	Meanwhile,	 it	 is	broadly	
acknowledged	 that	 land	 grabbing,	 food	 commodities	 speculation	 and	 the	 increasing	
production	of	bio	fuels	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	food	security.	So	far,	only	limited	
research	 has	 been	 undertaken	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 private	 sector	 addresses	
situations	 where	 the	 public	 policies	may	 not	 adequately	 take	 into	 account	 individual	
rights	such	as	the	right	to	have	access	to	food.	Given	that	there	is	still	no	comprehensive	
international	framework	for	corporate	human	rights	responsibility,	standards	that	have	
been	 initiated	 by	 industries	 and	 companies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 corporate	 social	
responsibility	 are	 increasingly	 relevant.	 In	 addition,	 the	 new	 “Protect,	 respect	 and	
remedy”	 framework	 adopted	 by	 the	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Council	 in	 2008	 and	
complemented	 with	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 respective	 Guidelines	 in	 2011	 raises	 the	
question	 to	 what	 extent	 states	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	 ensure	 responsible	 corporate	
behaviour.			
This	 paper	 contributes	 to	 the	 discussion	 on	 implementing	 the	Ruggie	 framework	 in	 a	
trade	context	by	adding	a	third	layer	of	analysis	to	the	existing	focus	on	the	individual	as	
the	holder	of	the	right	to	food	security	and	the	state	as	the	bearer	of	the	corresponding	
duties	both	under	human	rights	and	 international	 trade	 law.	 It	will	explore	the	role	of	
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business	 in	 acting	 as	 an	 intermediary	 between	 the	 individual,	 micro‐level	 and	 public	
policy	at	the	macro‐level.		
As	a	result,	 the	paper	proposes	a	comprehensive	 three‐dimensional	approach	towards	
the	implementation	of	food	security	that	goes	beyond	the	Ruggie	framework.	
Three	 proposals	 to	 overcome	 existing	 regulatory	 deficits	 and	 research	 gaps	 are	
submitted:	 (1)	 a	 need	 for	 analysing	 motivation	 and	 dynamics	 at	 the	 meso‐	 level	
(business),	(2)	improving	regulatory	procedures	by	mainstreaming	the	Protect,	Respect	
and	 Remedy	 Framework	 into	 business‐related	 policies	 and	 regulations	 and	 (3)	
improving	 regulatory	 substance	 by	 including	 findings	 from	meso‐level	 analysis	 in	 the	
substance	of	regulations.	
II. The	architecture	of	food	security			
1. The	fabric	of	food	security	
There	 are	 many	 definitions	 of	 food	 security	 depending	 on	 context	 and	 background.1	
Consensus	 can	 be	 established	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 World	 Food	 and	 Agriculture	
Organisation	 (FAO)	 which	 defined	 food	 security	 as	 the	 state	 “when	 all	 people,	 at	 all	
times,	have	physical	and	economic	access	to	sufficient,	safe	and	nutritious	food	to	meet	
their	dietary	needs	and	food	preferences	for	an	active	an	healthy	life.”2	Food	security	is	
therefore	 not	 limited	 to	 an	 adequate	 calorie	 intake	 but	 includes	 nutritional	 quality,	
safety	 and	 cultural	 appropriateness	 of	 food.	 Three	 key	 drivers	 for	 food	 security	 have	
been	 identified:3	Food	availability	which	relates	not	only	to	 the	distribution	but	also	to	
the	production	and	and	possibility	to	exchange	money	or	other	items	of	value	for	food.	
The	 second	 is	access	to	 the	 type,	quality	and	quantity	of	 food	 required.	 In	 this	 regard,	
affordability,	 allocation	 mechanisms	 and	 food	 preferences	 play	 an	 important	 role.	
																																																								
1		 Christine	Kaufmann,	Simone	Heri,	Liberalizing	Trade	in	Agriculture	and	Food	Security	‐	Mission	
Impossible?	Vanderbilt	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	40	(2007),	1039‐1070,	1048.	
2		 Rome	Declaration	and	World	Food	Summit	Plan	of	Action,	FAO,	Rome	1996,	para.	1.	
3		 Polly	Ericksen,	Beth	Stewart,	Jane	Dixon,	David	Barling,	Philip	Loring,	Molly	Anderson	and	John	
Ingram,	The	Value	of	a	Food	System	Approach,	in:	John	Ingram,	Polly	Ericksen	and	Diana	Liverman	
(eds),	Food	Security	and	Global	Environmental	Change,	London/Washington	2010,	25‐45,	29.		
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Finally,	 utilisation	 of	 food	 includes	 the	 ability	 to	 consume	 and	 benefit	 from	 food.	
Therefore,	nutritional	and	social	values	as	well	as	food	safety	are	essential.		
2. Actors	
Based	 on	 this	 definition	 of	 food	 security,	 individuals	 play	 a	 key	 role	 as	 holders	 of	 the	
right	to	food	–	which	food	security	is	part	of	–	and	as	producers	and	consumers	of	food.	
The	 correspondent	 legal	 obligation	 rests	 primarily	 upon	 states.	 According	 to	 the	
International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	it	is	their	obligation	to	
respect,	protect	and	fulfil	the	human	right	to	adequate	food.	Thus,	from	a	human	rights	
perspective,	there	is	a	clear	distinction	between	the	right‐holders	at	the	micro‐level	and	
duty‐bearers	 at	 the	macro‐level.	 As	 long	 as	 rights	 and	 obligations	match,	 such	 a	 two‐
prong	analysis	may	be	sufficient.	Yet,	reality	looks	different:		
Recent	 developments	 such	 as	 the	 coincidence	 of	 the	 food	 and	 the	 financial	 crisis	
together	 with	 climate	 change,	 show	 that	 the	 activities	 of	 private	 businesses	 have	 a	
substantial	impact	on	people’s	enjoyment	of	the	right	to	food	and	may	in	fact	even	play	a	
bigger	 role	 than	 the	 public	 sector.	 Since	 most	 actors	 in	 the	 food	 supply	 chain4	–	
production,	 processing,	 trade	 and	 distribution,	 wholesale	 and	 retail	–	 are	 private	
entities,	the	private	sector	has	a	direct	factual	impact	on	food	security.5	On	the	one	hand,	
this	 impact	 may	 be	 positive	 if	 companies	 create	 employment	 under	 conditions	 that	
enable	 employees	 and	 workers	 to	 feed	 themselves	 and	 their	 families	 and	 provide	
infrastructure	 such	 as	 access	 to	 safe	 water.	 On	 the	 other,	 business	 activities	 may	
undermine	people’s	access	to	 food	by	contaminating	 land	and	or	water	 for	example	 in	
the	context	of	mining	activities.		
Despite	 the	 potential	 impact	 of	 business	 activities	 on	 food	 security,	 the	 role	 of	 the	
private	 sector	 is	 not	 reflected	 in	 the	 traditional	 theoretical	 framework.	 This	 paper	
argues	that	a	third	meso‐level	of	analysis	needs	to	be	introduced	in	order	to	understand	
																																																								
4		 For	a	detailed	description	of	the	food	supply	chain	in	all	its	complexities	Michael	J.	Maloni,	Michael	E.	
Brown,	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	in	the	Supply	Chain:	an	Application	in	the	Food	Industry,	Journal	
of	Business	Ethics	68	(2006),	35‐52,	37‐38.	
5		 Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	The	Right	to	Adequate	Food,	Human	Rights	Fact	
Sheet	no.	34,	Geneva	2010,	p.	25.	
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new	phenomena	such	as	the	regulatory	role	of	private	standards.	As	its	name	suggests,	
the	meso‐level	situates	itself	between	the	micro‐	and	the	macro‐level.	In	an	environment	
where	 individual	 interests	 and	 state	 policies	 on	 food	 security	 may	 be	 misaligned,	
businesses	 need	 to	 develop	 their	 own	 mechanisms	 for	 addressing	 this	 dilemma.	
Business	activities	will	have	an	 impact	–	whether	deliberate	or	note	–	of	 their	own	on	
food	security.	At	the	same	time,	business	activities	are	driven	by	corporate	policies	such	
as	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 (CSR)	 which	 may	 be	 influenced	 by	 external	 factors	
such	as	public	opinion	or	consumer	reactions.		
International	 law	has	struggled	 to	accommodate	business	 in	 its	conceptual	 framework	
for	decades.	It	is	only	recently	that	the	United	Nations	Human	Rights	Council	adopted	a	
new	“Protect,	Respect	and	Remedy”	 framework	 (the	so‐called	 “Ruggie	Framework”)	as	
well	as	 the	complimentary	Guiding	Principles	on	Business	and	Human	Rights	(Guiding	
Principles)6	that	a	way	out	of	the	year‐long	dead	end	could	be	found.		
This	paper	will	shed	light	on	the	interaction	between	individuals	at	the	micro‐	and	states	
at	 the	macro‐level,	with	 businesses	 acting	 as	 a	mediator	 at	 the	meso‐level.	 It	will	 put	
forward	 a	 concept	 for	 a	 clearer	 understanding	 of	 what	 business	 responsibility	 in	 the	
food	security	context	means.		
III. Current	state	of	food	security	
1. Triple	crises	
With	 the	 coincidence	 of	 three	 global	 crises	 –	 climate	 change,	 food	 and	 finance	 –	 food	
security	 became	 an	 item	 on	 the	 agenda	 in	 institutions	 which	 are	 not	 traditionally	
engaged	with	human	rights.	7		
																																																								
6		 Protect,	Respect	and	Remedy:	a	Framework	for	Business	and	Human	Rights,	Report	of	the	Special	
Representative	of	the	Secretary‐General	on	the	issue	of	human	rights	and	transnational	corporations	
and	other	business	enterprises,	John	Ruggie,	A/HRC/8/5,	7	April	2008;	Guiding	Principles	on	
Business	and	Human	Rights:	Implementing	the	United	Nations	“Protect,	Respect	and	Remedy”	
Framework,	Report	of	the	Special	Representative	of	the	Secretary‐General	on	the	issue	of	human	
rights	and	transnational	corporations	and	other	business	enterprises,	John	Ruggie,	A/HRC/17/31,	
21	March	2011.	
7		 For	a	more	detailed	discussion	see	Christine	Kaufmann,	International	Law	in	Recession?	The	role	of	
international	law	when	crisis	hits:	Food,	finance	and	climate	change,	U.	Fastenrath,	R.	Geiger,	D‐E.	
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The	 end	of	2009	marks	 a	 turning	point	 since	 the	number	of	 severely	undernourished	
people	reached	an	unprecedented	high,	and	for	the	first	time	in	human	history	exceeded	
one	billion.8	Food	prices	peaked	in	February	2011	with	the	highest	level	recorded	since	
1990.9	Since	then	price	levels	have	fallen	by	about	14%	until	May	2012	and	–	according	
to	the	FAO	–	seem	to	have	stabilized	at	a	relatively	high	level.	Overall,	the	period	since	
1990	 is	 characterized	 by	 tight	 food	 supplies,	 higher	 prices	 and	 increased	 price	
volatility.10		
One	of	the	manifold	reasons	underlying	the	food	crisis	are	changes	in	the	environmental	
context.	 This	 includes	 large‐scale	 changes	 in	 land	 use,	 biogeochemical	 cycles,	 climate	
and	 biodiversity.	 Together,	 they	 collectively	 constitute	 a	 global	 environmental	 change	
that	is	occurring	at	an	unprecedented	scale	of	human	intervention	in	the	earth	system.11	
Recent	 results	 from	 research	 on	 climate	 change	 therefore	 play	 an	 essential	 role	 in	
understanding	the	food	crisis.	12		
The	third	crisis	is	the	financial	crisis	which	has	been	at	the	centre	of	public	attention	for	
almost	 five	 years	 now.	 At	 the	 beginning,	 the	 collapse	 of	 Northern	 Rock	 and	 Lehman	
Brothers	in	2008	sparked	a	series	of	meetings	of	ministers	and	heads	of	State,	followed	
by	another	spell	of	 intense	high‐level	negotiations	with	regard	 to	 the	developments	 in	
																																																																																																																																																																													
Khan,	A.	Paulus,	S.	von	Schorlemer,	Ch.	Vedder	(eds.),	From	Bilateralism	to	Community	Interest,	
Essays	in	Honour	of	Bruno	Simma,	Munich	2011,	1189‐1206.	
8		 World	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization,	The	State	of	Food	Insecurity	in	the	World	2009	(2009)	11	
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i0876e/i0876e00.HTM>	(accessed	18	June	2012).	“Billion”	means	
a	thousand	million.	
9		 World	Food	and	Agriculture	Organisation,	FAO	Food	Price	Index	(FFPI),	available	at	
<http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs‐home/foodpricesindex/en/>	(accessed	16	June	
2012).	The	FAO	Food	Price	Index	is	a	measure	of	the	monthly	change	in	international	prices	of	a	
basket	of	food	commodities.	It	consists	of	the	average	of	five	commodity	group	price	indices	
(representing	55	quotations),	weighted	with	the	average	export	shares	of	each	of	the	groups	for	
2002‐2004.	
10		 FAO,	World	Food	Outlook,	May	2012.	Available	at	
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/al989e/al989e00.pdf	>	(	accessed	16	June	2012).		
11		 Diana	Liverman	and	Kamal	Kapadia,	Food	Systems	and	the	Global	Environment:	An	Overview,	in	
Ingram,	Ericksen	and	Liverman	(note	3),	3.	
12		 IPCC,	Climate	Change	2007:	Synthesis	Report,	Contribution	of	Working	Groups	I,	II	and	III	to	the	
Fourth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC,	2008)	104	et	
seq.,	available	at	
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_
report.htm>	accessed	29	June	2010.	
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the	 Euro	 Zone.	 Neither	 the	 World	 Food	 Summit	 in	 November	 2009,	 nor	 the	 Climate	
Summit	 in	Copenhagen	 in	December	2009,	nor	 even	 the	Rio+20	Conference	 in	Rio	de	
Janeiro	 in	 June	 2012	 succeeded	 in	 creating	 a	 similar	 sense	 of	 urgency	 among	 world	
leaders.		
2. Effects	on	the	individual:	Micro‐level	
From	an	individual	and	a	human	rights	perspective,	the	distributive	effects	of	the	crises	
are	crucial.	Particularly	affected	by	these	developments	and	the	triple	occurrence	of	the	
crises	are	the	poor.13	An	example	is	the	production	of	biofuels	which	has	been	promoted	
as	a	means	to	combat	climate	change.	It	is	characterized	by	large	scale	land	acquisitions	
usually	undertaken	by	big	companies	often	engaged	in	partnerships	with	the	respective	
government.		
While	workers	employed	by	the	companies	engaged	in	the	production	of	bio	fuel	may	be	
better	off,	small	scale	farmers	will	find	it	more	difficult	to	have	access	to	farm	land	with	
prices	rising	given	the	increasing	demand.	At	the	same	time,	due	to	the	financial	crisis,	
obtaining	loans	for	establishing	a	new	business	has	become	more	costly.	Being	deprived	
of	food	security	can	easily	trigger	the	violation	of	other	human	rights	such	as	the	right	to	
education	when	children	are	forced	to	contribute	to	the	family	income	instead	of	going	
to	school	or	the	right	to	health	when	malnutrition	and	unbalanced	diets	lead	to	diseases.	
IV. Macro‐Level	 policies:	 Preventing	 market	 failure	 –	 a	 guarantor	 for	 food	
security?	
1. Adjusting	priorities:	The	G‐20	
a) The	traditional	avenue:	Food	security	as	an	element	of	sustainable	growth	
The	three	on‐going	crises	were	clearly	on	 the	agenda	of	G‐20	 leaders	already	 in	2009.	
Following	up	on	the	G‐8	summit	in	L’Aquila,14	at	the	Summit	in	Pittsburgh	in	September	
																																																								
13		 Rasmus	Heltberg,	Naoim	Hossain,	Anna	Reva	(eds),	Living	through	Crises:	How	the	Food,	Fuel,	and	
Financial	Shocks	Affect	the	Poor,	World	Bank,	Washington	2012.	
14		 G‐8	Summit	2009,	L’Aquila	Joint	Statement	of	Global	Food	Security—L’Aquila	Food	Security	Initiative’	
(10	July	2009),	available	at	<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2009laquila/2009‐food.html>	
(accessed	19	June	2012).	
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2009,	the	G‐20	made	specific	commitments	to	increase	access	to	food,	fuel,	and	finance	
for	the	most	vulnerable	groups.	Moreover,	G‐20	leaders	called	for	identifying	new	ideas	
to	 strengthen	 the	poors’	 access	 to	 the	 financial	 system.	 In	 a	 rather	 general	 statement,	
they	 agreed	 “to	 explore	 new	 ways	 of	 increasing	 the	 capability	 of	 the	 international	
system	to	mobilize	quickly	the	resources	needed	to	help	the	most	vulnerable	countries	
deal	with	future	crises”.15		
Yet,	 it	 seems	 that	 a	 few	months	 later,	 at	 the	G‐20	 leaders	meeting	 in	Toronto,	 in	 June	
2010,	some	of	the	momentum	had	been	lost.	With	global	food	prices	declining	and	the	
costs	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 for	 banks	 and	 investors	 reaching	 US$2.3	 trillion16	in	 an	
estimate	published	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	in	April	2010,17	the	Final	
Declaration	defined	the	priorities	of	the	G‐20	in	very	general	terms:		
“7.	The	G‐20’s	highest	priority	is	to	safeguard	and	strengthen	the	recovery	and	lay	
the	 foundation	 for	 strong,	 sustainable	 and	 balanced	 growth,	 and	 strengthen	 our	
financial	systems	against	risks	[…].		
8.	The	Framework	for	Strong,	Sustainable	and	Balanced	Growth	that	we	launched	
in	 Pittsburgh	 is	 the	 means	 to	 achieving	 our	 shared	 objectives,	 by	 assessing	 the	
collective	consistency	of	policy	actions	and	strengthening	policy	frameworks”.18	
Still,	 the	 door	 for	 more	 inclusive	 approaches	 was	 left	 open	 with	 the	 plan	 to	 explore	
“innovative,	results‐focused	ways	of	harnessing	private	sector	innovations”.19		
In	November	2010,	the	G‐20	leaders	met	in	Seoul	for	their	first	summit	taking	place	in	
an	emerging	country.	The	“Seoul	Action	Plan”	was	adopted	as	a	“comprehensive	package	
of	country‐specific	policy	actions	to	support	strong,	sustainable	and	balanced	economic	
																																																								
15		 G‐20	Summit	2009,	Leaders’	Statement,	Pittsburgh	Summit	(24–25	September	2009)	paras	22–3	of	
the	preamble,	paras	34–9,	available	at	
<http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html>	(accessed	17	June	2012).			
16		 Trillion	means	a	thousand	billion,	billion	means	a	thousand	million.		
17		 International	Monetary	Fund,	‘World	Economic	Outlook’	(April	2010)	3,	
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/index.htm>	(accessed	29	June	2010).	
18		 G‐20	Summit	2010,	The	G‐20	Toronto	Summit	Final	Declaration	(26‐28	June	2010),	available	at	
<http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to‐communique.html>	(accessed	18	June	2012),	paras.	7‐8.	
19		 G‐20	Toronto	Summit	(note	18),	para.	34	
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growth.”20	In	addition,	specific	measures	to	better	identify	currency	imbalances	as	well	
as	 IMF	quota	and	governance	reforms	were	agreed	upon.	Although	one	of	goals	of	 the	
summit	was	to	include	developing	countries	and	their	concerns	into	the	debates,	the	still	
on‐going	 food	 crisis	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 pressing	 issues	 for	 these	 countries	 was	 only	
addressed	 specifically	 in	 the	 final	 declaration	 with	 regard	 to	 addressing	 food	market	
volatility.21		
b) AgResults:	Result‐driven	funding	for	private	actors	–	the	road	to	innovation?	
Since	the	Seoul	summit,	the	volatility	of	food	prices	has	become	the	major	concern	of	the	
G‐20	 with	 regard	 to	 food	 security.	 In	 the	 final	 declaration	 of	 the	 Cannes	 Summit	 in	
November	2011,	a	separate	section	was	dedicated	to	“Addressing	Food	Price	Volatility	
and	 Increasing	 Agriculture	 Production	 and	 Productivity”.22	A	 first	 meeting	 of	 G‐20	
agriculture	ministers	 in	 June	 2011	 had	 paved	 the	way	 for	 an	 agreement	 by	 the	 G‐20	
leaders	 on	 a	 five	 point	 action	 plan:	 (1)	 Improving	 agricultural	 production	 and	
productivity,	 (2)	 increasing	 market	 information	 and	 transparency,	 (3)	 reducing	 the	
effects	of	price	volatility	for	the	most	vulnerable,	(4)	strengthening	international	policy	
coordination	and	(5)	 improving	 the	 functioning	of	agricultural	commodity	derivatives’	
markets.23		
This	plan	together	with	the	earlier	commitments	at	the	Toronto	summit	in	2010	fed	into	
the	launch	of	the	“AgResults”	Initiative	at	the	Los	Cabos	G‐20	Summit	on	18	June	2012.24	
The	initiative	is	built	on	the	–	not	so	new	–	insight	that	investment	in	food	security	needs	
to	 be	 increased	 and	 that	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 this	 goal,	 the	 private	 sector	 needs	 to	 be	
involved	more.	Therefore,	AgResults	 adopts	an	 innovative	approach	by	using	 so‐called	
pull	mechanisms	to	encourage	innovation	through	results‐based	payments	such	as	prices	
																																																								
20		 G‐20	Summit	2010,	The	G‐20	Seoul	Summit	Leaders’	Declaration	(11‐12	November	2011),	para.	9,	
available	at	<http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.html>(accessed	18	June	2012).		
21		 Seoul	Summit	Leaders’	Declaration	(note	20),	para.	12.	
22		 G‐20	Leaders	Summit	2011,	Cannes	Summit	Final	Declaration	(3‐4	November	2011),	paras.40‐51,	
available	at	<http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011‐cannes‐declaration‐111104‐en.html>	
(accessed	18	June	2012).	
23		 Cannes	Summit	Final	Declaration	(note	22),	para.	42.	
24		 G‐20	Summit	2012,	G20	Leaders	Declaration,	Los	Cabos,	18‐19	June	2012	para.	59.	
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that	 are	 typically	 paid	 out	 when	 certain	 objectives	 or	 milestones	 have	 been	 met.25	
Instead	 of	 setting	 binding	 state‐led	 rules,	 economic	 incentives	 are	 used	 to	 trigger	 the	
desired	behaviour	of	the	private	sector.		
Implementing	 a	 pull	mechanism	differs	 from	 earlier	 initiatives	 because	 the	 award	 for	
desired	results	will	be	provided	ex	post	instead	of	granting	ex	ante	incentives,	such	as	eg	
tax	 concessions	or	public‐private	partnerships.	 Examples	 for	pull	mechanisms	 include	
the	 Haiti	 Mobile	 Money	 Initiative	 which	 awards	 $4	 million	 to	 the	 first	 and	 second	
operators	 to	 launch	 mobile	 money	 services	 in	 Haiti	 or	 extending	 market	 exclusivity	
beyond	normal	patent	protection	 for	newly	developed	drugs	against	 rare	disorders	as	
provided	in	the	US	Orphan	Drug	Act	of	1983	and	similar	EU	legislation.26			
It	 is	 hoped	 that	 this	 new	 approach	 will	 overcome	 existing	 market	 failures	 by	
emphasising	ends	rather	than	means.	Two	types	of	market	 failures	are	essential	 in	the	
context	 of	 food	 security:	 First,	 markets	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 reflect	 the	 social	 value	 of	
innovative	 measures,	 i.e.	 not	 capture	 the	 positive	 externalities.	 Second,	 imperfect	
information	 may	 contribute	 to	 low	 investment	 in	 agricultural	 innovation	 and	 to	 low	
consumption	of	innovative	goods.	
In	order	to	shape	this	new	instrument	and	tailor	 it	according	to	the	needs	several	 five	
pilot	 projects	 have	 been	 defined:	 crop	 biofortification,	 on‐farm	 crop	 storage,	 aflatoxin	
control,	 livestock	 vaccination	 and	 improved	 fertilizers.	 These	 pilot	 projects	 will	 be	
implemented	and	evaluated	by	a	specialist	advisory	body	established	specifically	for	this	
purpose.	After	four	years	an	independent	external	evaluation	process	is	planned.			
While	the	concept	note	lays	out	the	methodological	framework	in	some	detail,	nothing	is	
said	 about	 how	 this	 new	 approach	 can	 be	 placed	 in	 the	 broader	 picture	 of	 current	
endeavours	 to	 strengthen	 corporate	 responsibility	 for	 human	 rights	 including	 food	
security.	 Most	 strikingly,	 no	 reference	 to	 recently	 developed	 instruments	 by	 the	 UN	
Human	Rights	Council	is	made.	
																																																								
25		 AgResults,	Innovation	in	Research	and	Delivery,	draft	concept	note	prepared	by	the	Australian	
Agency	for	International	Development	on	behalf	of	the	AgResults	Steering	Committee,	18	June	2012,	
available	at	http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/AgResults_concept_note.pdf	
(accessed	19	June	2012).	
26		 Concept	Note	(note	25),	para.	7.	
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2. Addressing	the	role	of	private	actors	
The	 fact	 that	 private	 investors	 may	 contribute	 substantially	 to	 financial	 crises	 and	
further	 increase	 already	 existing	 market	 volatilities	 has	 been	 well	 established	 in	
economic	 literature	 not	 least	 since	 the	 East‐Asian	 Financial	 Crisis	 of	 1997/98.27	Yet,	
opinions	on	how	to	tackle	this	phenomenon	in	a	food	security	context	vary	considerably.	
a) Right	to	food‐based	approaches	
With	regard	to	food	security,	the	UN	Special	Rapporteur,	Olivier	de	Schutter	issued	three	
briefing	notes	 in	2010/11	 to	 address	 the	 role	of	business	 and	a	 report	 to	 the	General	
Assembly	on	contract	farming	in	2011.28	The	first	note	on	Food	Commodity	Speculation	
was	 directly	 linked	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 related	 policy	
responses.29	The	 second	dealt	with	 competition	 law	by	 addressing	 the	unequal	 power	
distribution	on	food	markets,30	and	the	third	was	the	result	of	a	research	project	on	the	
role	 of	 the	WTO	 in	 defining	 a	 post	 food	 crisis	 agenda.31	In	 essence,	 all	 briefing	 notes	
attempt	to	address	market	failures	as	described	above.	What	was	new	in	de	Schutter’s	
approach	is	his	taking	a	human	rights	perspective	in	addressing	market	failures.		
His	 findings	were	 further	 developed	 and	 integrated	 in	 the	 Committee	 on	World	 Food	
Security	(CFS)	High	Level	Panel	of	Experts’	report	on	Price	Volatility	and	Food	Security.32		
The	mentioned	reports	share	a	focus	on	state	measures	and	call	for	specific	measures	in	
the	 areas	 of	 trade,	 stocks,	 speculation,	 investment	 and	 demand.	 They	 suggest	 stricter	
																																																								
27		 Stephan	Haggard,	The	Political	Economy	of	the	Financial	Crisis,	Washington	2000.	
28		 The	right	to	Food,	interim	report	of	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	right	food,	Olivier	De	Schutter,	
A/66/262,	4	August	2011.		
29		 Olivier	de	Schutter,	Food	Commodity	Speculation	and	Food	Price	Crises	–	Regulation	to	reduce	the	risk	
of	price	volatilities,	Briefing	Note	2/September	2010,	available	at	
<http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/documents‐issued/briefing‐notes>	(accessed	19	June	2012).	
30		 Olivier	de	Schutter,	Addressing	Concentration	in	Food	Supply	Chains	–	The	Role	of	Competition	Law	in	
Tackling	the	Abuse	of	Buyer	Power,	Briefing	Note	3/December	2010,	available	at	
<http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/documents‐issued/briefing‐notes>	(accessed	19	June	2012).	
31		 Olivier	de	Schutter,	The	World	Trade	Organisation	and	the	Post‐Global	Food	Crisis	Agenda	–	Putting	
Food	Security	First	in	the	International	Trading	System,	Briefing	Note	4/November	2011,	available	at	
<http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/documents‐issued/briefing‐notes>	(accessed	19	June	2012).	
32		 Committee	on	World	Food	Security,	High	Level	Panel	of	Experts	on	Food	Security	and	Nutrition,	
Report	on	Price	Volatility	and	Food	Security,	Rome,	2011	
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regulation	 against	 speculation	 with	 food‐related	 financial	 instruments	 (derivatives)	
following	the	example	of	the	US	Dodd‐Frank	Act.33	Neither	is	there	any	reference	on	how	
business	 activities	 can	 be	 brought	 in	 line	 with	 food	 security,	 nor	 is	 the	 new	 Protect,	
Respect	and	Remedy	framework34	applied.		
b) Interagency	report	
With	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 Food	 Security	 pillar	 in	 the	 Seoul	 Multi‐year	 Action	 Plan	 on	
Development,	the	G‐20	had	requested	“FAO,	IFAD,	IMF,	OECD;	UNCTAD,	WFP,	the	World	
Bank	 and	 the	 WTO	 to	 work	 with	 key	 stakeholders	 to	 develop	 options	 for	 G‐20	
consideration	on	how	to	better	mitigate	and	manage	the	risks	associated	with	the	price	
volatility	 of	 food	 and	 other	 agriculture	 commodities,	 without	 distorting	 market	
behaviour,	 ultimately	 to	 protect	 the	 most	 vulnerable”.35	The	 resulting	 report	 “Price	
Volatility	 in	 Food	 and	 Agricultural	Markets:	 Policy	 responses”	 was	 presented	 in	 June	
2011.36	It	 contains	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 several	 of	 the	 main	 drivers	 for	 food	 price	
volatility.	 However,	 the	 ten	 recommendations	 fall	 somewhat	 short	 of	 the	 more	
promising	analysis	in	the	body	of	the	report;	thus	they	reflect	some	of	the	difficulties	in	
engaging	 in	 interagency	 cooperation.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 the	 report	 was	 criticised	 inter	
alia	for	not	taking	the	discussion	to	a	higher	level	by	addressing	the	pressing	problem	of	
facing	higher	market	volatility	and	rising	prices	at	the	same	time.	Business	behaviour	as	
such	 is	 not	 addressed	 in	 the	 report.	 In	 fact,	 there	 is	 no	 reference	 to	 the	 debate	 on	
corporate	responsibility	for	human	rights.	
																																																								
33		 Dodd‐Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	2010	(H.R.	4173),	Pub.L.	No.	111‐203,	
124	Stat.	1375,	12	USC	5301	et	seq.	
34		 See	fn	6.	
35		 Multi‐Year	Action	Plan	on	Development,	12	November,	2010,	Annex	II	to	the	G‐20	Seoul	Summit	
Document,	action	2,	available	at	<	http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul‐development.html>	
(accessed	20	June	2012).	
36		 Price	Volatility	in	Food	and	Agricultural	Markets:	Policy	Responses.	Policy	Report	including	
contributions	by	FAO,	IFAD,	IMF,	OECD,	UNCTAD,	WFP,	The	World	Bank,	the	WTO,	IFPRI	and	the	UN	
High	Level	Task	Force	on	Global	Food	Security,	2	June	2011,	available	at	
<http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3746,en_2649_37401_48152724_1_1_1_37401,00.html>	
(accessed	19	June	2012).		
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c) National	policy:	Dodd‐Frank	Act	
The	Dodd‐Frank	Act	was	adopted	in	2010.	It	is	contains	a	broad	package	of	measures	to	
address	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Among	 the	 various	 instruments	 are	 also	
provisions	to	limit	positions	in	order	to	restrict	the	number	of	contracts	a	trading	entity	
could	hold	during	a	specific	time	period	(depending	on	the	commodity	from	90	days	to	a	
year).	As	a	result,	speculators’	excessive	liquidity	and	the	related	price	distortion	should	
be	prevented.	The	Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission	(CFTC)	which	is	in	charge	of	
implementing	 the	 position	 limits	 took	 a	 first	 measure	 in	 October	 2011	 by	 setting	 a	
position	limit	to	28	commodities.	However,	position	limits	are	heavily	criticised	by	the	
affected	 industry.	As	a	result,	 the	 International	Swaps	and	Derivatives	Association	and	
the	 Securities	 and	 Financial	Markets	 Association	 filed	 a	 lawsuit	 against	 CFTC	 arguing	
that	 it	had	not	evaluated	the	economic	impact	of	the	position	limit	before	and	that	the	
measure	was	at	best	unnecessary	may	at	worst	negatively	impact	commodity	markets.	
At	the	time	of	this	writing,	the	case	is	pending	with	the	District	Court	for	the	District	of	
Columbia.37	Apart	from	this	lawsuit,	implementation	of	the	Dodd‐Frank	Act	is	generally	
delayed.	Budget	 increases	 for	providing	CFTC	with	 additional	 resources	 to	 implement	
the	Dodd‐Frank	Act	have	so	 far	been	difficult	 to	pass	through	Congress.	An	agreement	
between	 the	 CFTC	 and	 the	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	 Commission	 on	 the	 definition	 of	
which	derivatives	contracts	are	swaps	and	will	fall	under	the	new	trading	rules	has	still	
not	been	reached.	As	a	result,	the	position	limits	cannot	take	effect.		
Overall,	the	Dodd‐Frank	Act	follows	a	risk‐based	approach	by	setting	detailed	technical	
limits	such	as	the	time	periods	for	holding	positions.	With	its	broad	coverage	of	issues	
related	to	the	financial	crisis,	the	Dodd‐Frank	Act	is	one	of	the	most	complex	bodies	of	
regulation	for	the	financial	industry.	One	of	the	challenges	is	that	it	does	not	provide	a	
clear	 basic	 concept	 of	 what	 corporate	 responsibility	 entails	 but	 rather	 engages	 in	
numerous	highly	detailed	regulations	of	specific	questions.		
																																																								
37		 International	Swaps	and	Derivatives	Association,	Securities	and	Financial	Markets	Association	v.	
United	States	Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission,	filed	with	the	US	District	Court	for	the	
District	of	Columbia,	December	2,	2011,	No.	11‐CV‐2146	(RLW).	
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Despite	 these	shortcomings,	many	civil	 society	organisations	consider	Dodd‐Frank	Act	
as	a	minimal	standard	or	model	regulation	to	be	introduced	in	other	countries	as	well.38		
V. The	missing	link	at	the	meso‐level:	Business	responsibility	to	respect		
1. The	business	of	business	is	business?	
In	1962	Nobel	Prize	winner	Milton	Friedman	took	a	clear	stand	on	what	in	his	view	the	
responsibility	of	business	should	be:		
“There	 is	one	and	only	one	social	 responsibility	of	business	–	 to	use	 it	 resources	
and	engage	in	activities	designed	to	increase	its	profits	so	long	as	it	stays	within	the	
rules	of	the	game,	which	 is	 to	 say,	 engages	 in	 open	 and	 free	 competition	without	
deception	or	fraud.	[…]	If	businessmen	do	have	a	social	responsibility	other	than	to	
making	maximum	profits	 for	 their	stockholder,	how	are	they	 to	know	what	 it	 is?	
Can	self‐selected	private	 individuals	decide	what	 the	public	 interest	 is?	Can	 they	
decide	 how	 great	 a	 burden	 they	 are	 justified	 in	 placing	 on	 themselves	 or	 their	
stockholders	to	serve	that	social	interest?"39		
In	1974	Friedman	further	elaborated	on	his	earlier	statement	in	an	interview:		
“In	the	first	place,	the	only	entities	who	can	have	responsibilities	are	individuals;	a	
business	cannot	have	responsibilities.	 So	 the	question	 is,	do	corporate	executives,	
provided	they	stay	within	the	law,	have	responsibilities	in	their	business	activities	
other	 than	 to	make	 as	much	money	 for	 their	 stockholders	 as	 possible?	 And	my	
answer	to	that	is,	no	they	do	not.	“40	
Friedman’s	 argument	 has	 been	 summarized	 ever	 since	with	 the	 often	 quoted	 phrase.	
“The	 business	 of	 business	 is	 business.”	 Yet,	 the	 “rules	 of	 the	 game”	 that	 Freedman	
																																																								
38		 An	example	is	the	report	published	by	Friends	of	the	Earth	International,	Farming	money:	how	
European	banks	and	private	finance	profit	from	food	speculation	and	land	grabs,	Brussels,	January	
2012,	at	40	which	calls	on	the	EU	to	“at	least	follow	the	US	example.”	Available	at	
<http://www.foeeurope.org/farming‐money‐Jan2012>	(accessed	20	June	2012).	
39		 Milton	Friedman,	Capitalism	and	Freedom,	(1st	edition,	Chicago	1962),	40th	anniversary	edition	2002,	
133/4	(emphasis	added	by	the	author).		
40		 “Milton	Friedman	Responds",	Interview	with	Milton	Friedman,	conducted	by	John	McClaughry,	in	
ChemTech	(February	1974)	pp.	72‐78,	at	72.	
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referred	 to	 in	 1962	 seem	 to	 have	 substantially	 changed	 as	 the	 following	 examples	
illustrate:		
In	2006,	the	International	Employers’	Association	submitted	a	Proposal	 for	addressing	
dilemma	situations	in	weak	governance	zones	to	the	then	Special	Representative	of	the	
UN	 Secretary‐General	 for	 business	 and	 human	 rights,	 Professor	 John	 Ruggie.	 The	
proposal	 contained	 a	 statement	 that	 could	 hardly	 be	 in	 sharper	 contrast	 with	
Friedman’s	view:			
“The	international	business	community	strongly	supports	respect	for	human	rights	
not	 only	 because	 it	 is	 the	 right	 thing	 to	 do,	 but	 also	 because	 protecting	 human	
rights	 benefits	 all	 actors	 in	 society.	 To	 flourish,	 both	 domestic	 and	 international	
companies	 require	 the	 same	 basic	 principles,	 government	 policies	 and	 national	
institutions	to	protect	human	rights.”	41		
This	 new	 approach	which	 focuses	 on	 the	 connections	 between	 societal	 and	 economic	
progress	 has	 been	 conceptionalized	 differently	 across	 different	 disciplines.	 In	
international	 law,	 business	 responsibility	 has	 been	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 debate	 on	 the	
fragmentation	 of	 the	 international	 legal	 order42	while	 the	 discussion	 in	 economics	 is	
focussed	on	the	concept	of	corporate	governance43	and	creating	shared	value.44	All	these	
approaches	have	 in	 common	 that	 they	 represent	 a	 change	 in	paradigm	and	 react	 to	 a	
changing	environment.		
																																																								
41		 International	Organisation	of	Employers	(IOE),	in	collaboration	with	the	International	Chamber	of	
Commerce	(ICC)	and	the	Business	and	Industry	Advisory	Committee	(BIAC)	to	the	OECD,	Business	
proposals	for	effective	ways	of	addressing	dilemma	situations	in	weak	governance	zones,	December	
2006,	para.	7.	Available	at	http://www.reports‐and‐materials.org/Role‐of‐Business‐in‐Weak‐
Governance‐Zones‐Dec‐2006.pdf		(last	visited	on	16	June	2012).		
42		 Christine	Breining‐Kaufmann,	The	Legal	Matrix	of	Human	Rights	and	Trade	Law:	State	Obligations	
versus	Private	Rights	and	Obligations,	in:	Thomas	Cottier/Joost	Pauwelyn/Elisabeth	Bürgi	(Hrsg.),	
Human	Rights	and	International	Trade,	Oxford	2005	(Oxford	University	Press),	95‐136.	
43		 Andreas	Georg	Scherer,	Guido	Palazzo,	Dirk	Matten,	Globalization	as	a	challenge	for	business	
responsibilities,	Business	Ethics	Quarterly,	19	(2009),	327‐347.	
44		 The	concept	was	first	introduced	in	2006	and	significantly	expanded	in	2011:	Michael	E.	Porter,	
Strategy	and	Society,	The	Link	between	Competitive	Advantage	and	Corporate	Social	Responsibility,	
Harvard	Business	Review	84	(2006),	78‐92;	Mark	R.	Kramer,	Michael	E.	Porter,	Mark	R.	Kramer,	
Creating	Shared	Value,	Harvard	Business	Review,	89	(2011),	62‐77.	
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2. Changing	perceptions	and	new	rules		
At	 the	 international	 level,	 responsibility	 of	 business	 first	 became	 an	 issue	 in	 the	 UN	
General	Assembly	after	the	alleged	involvement	of	the	US	based	multinational	company	
ITT	in	the	overthrow	of	the	Allende	regime	in	Chile	in	1973.45	It	gained	new	momentum	
in	 the	 1990s	 with	 liberalization,	 technology,	 and	 innovations	 in	 corporate	 structure	
enabling	 business	 to	 operate	 globally	 to	 an	 unprecedented	 extent.	 This	 development	
contributed	 to	 an	 increased	 awareness	 of	 governance	 gaps	 which	 had	 already	 –	 in	 a	
different	context	–	been	at	 the	heart	of	 the	debate	 in	 the	1970s:	Besides	the	economic	
benefit	which	many	countries	were	able	to	participate	in,	the	existing	legal	 framework	
as	well	as	exiting	 institutions	were	 ill	 suited	 to	accommodate	new	actors	and	keep	up	
with	 the	 speed	of	market	 expansion	 in	order	 to	 address	potential	negative	 impacts	of	
these	developments.46		
In	 a	 system	 of	 international	 law	 that	 is	 still	 substantially	 based	 on	 the	 Westphalian	
concept	of	the	sovereign	state	as	the	prime	legal	subject,	regardless	of	 their	 impact	on	
people’s	 live,	 multinational	 companies	 cannot	 be	 accommodated	 easily.	 During	 the	
Nuremberg	Tribunals	which	were	 the	 first	 international	 tribunals	 to	decide	on	 forced	
labour	 in	 a	 business	 context,	 managers	 and	 directors	 of	 the	 German	 companies	 IG	
Farben,	 Krupp	 and	 Flick	 were	 charged	 with	 abusing	 forced	 labourers	 from	
concentration	 camps	 in	 their	 business	 activities.	 The	 Tribunals	 did	 not	 acknowledge	
legal	personality	of	 the	 involved	companies	under	 international	 law	but	attributed	the	
crimes	against	humanity	either	to	the	German	state	or	the	involved	individuals.47		
Not	surprisingly,	all	attempts	within	the	UN	since	the	1970s	to	develop	a	binding	legal	
framework	 for	 holding	 MNEs	 accountable	 under	 international	 law	 after	 decades	 of	
discussions	were	doomed	to	fail.	The	last	proposal	in	this	endeavour,	the	“Draft	Norms	
on	 the	Responsibilities	 of	 Transnational	 Corporations	 and	Other	Business	 Enterprises	
																																																								
45		 Intelligence	Activities,	Senate	Resolution	21,	Hearings	before	the	Select	Committee	to	Study	
Governmental	Operations	with	Respect	to	Intelligence	of	the	United	States	Senate,	94th	Congress,	1st	
session,	Vol.	7	Covert	Action,	December	4	and	5,	1975:	Appendix	A:	Covert	Action	in	Chile	1963‐1973,	
pp.	158‐160.		
46		 Protect,	respect	and	remedy	framework	(fn	6)	para.	104.	
47		 United	Nations	War	Crimes	Commission,	Law	Reports	of	Trials	of	War	Crimes,	Volume	X,	The	I.G.	
Farben	and	Krupp	Trials,	London	1949,	Case	No.	57	(I.G.	Farben),	Case	No.	58	(Krupp).	
Draft	paper–	please	do	not	quote	without	the	author’s	permission	
16	
	
with	Regard	to	Human	Rights”	tried	to	overcome	the	existing	conceptual	limits	by	legally	
binding	states	only,	while	at	 the	same	time	defining	precise	rules	which	as	part	of	 the	
state	obligations	should	have	been	imposed	on	companies.48	What	seemed	to	be	a	logical	
approach	given	the	rigid	framework	unfolded	a	whole	matrix	of	problems:	Why	had	only	
some	 human	 rights	 such	 as	 labour	 rights	 been	 included	 in	 the	 Draft	 Norms	 and	 not	
others?	How	could	the	sphere	of	influence	which	had	to	be	established	in	order	to	hold	
companies	responsible	be	defined?		
While	business	associations	such	as	the	International	Chamber	of	Commerce	took	a	firm	
stand	against	the	Draft	Norms	on	an	operational	level,49	many	multinational	companies	
had	started	defining	social	policies	that	would	include	at	least	some	human	rights.		
Despite	turning	and	twisting	concepts	around	for	decades,	the	fact	that	the	international	
community	was	not	willing	to	accept	companies	as	subjects	of	international	law	which	
would	 have	 been	 a	 prerequisite	 to	 hold	 them	 legally	 accountable	 had	 remained	
unchanged.		
When	John	Ruggie	was	entrusted	with	the	mandate	as	Special	Representative	of	the	UN	
Secretary‐General	 in	 2005,	 he	 quickly	 abandoned	 the	 traditional	 approach	 of	 strictly	
separating	 the	 realm	 of	 binding	 state	 obligations	 and	 voluntary	 corporate	 behaviour.	
The	Protect,	Respect	and	Remedy	Framework	of	2008	and	the	complementary	Guiding	
Principles	 of	 2011	 were	 both	 accepted	 by	 the	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Council.50	In	 the	
following	sections,	the	relevance	of	this	framework	for	food	security	will	be	explored.	
a) Lost	in	translation:	negative	human	rights	impact		market	failure	
It	is	striking	to	note	how	all	the	reports	mentioned	in	the	previous	sections	are	based	on	
the	 hypothesis	 that	 business	 behaviour	 such	 as	 large‐scale	 investment	 or	 speculation	
with	 food	 related	 financial	 instruments	may	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 food	 security.	
																																																								
48		 Draft	Norms	on	the	Responsibilities	of	Transnational	Corporations	and	Other	Business	Enterprises	
with	Regard	to	Human	Rights,	26	August	2003,	E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12	(2003).		
49		 Joint	views	of	the	IOE	and	ICC	on	the	draft	norms	on	the	responsibilities	of	transnational	corporations	
and	other	business	enterprises	with	regard	to	human	rights,	E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/44,	29	July	
2003.	
50			 Above	fn	6.	
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Although	none	of	the	reports	precisely	defines	its	underlying	notion	of	“negative	impact”	
it	seems	to	be	understood	as	an	effect	which	is	in	contrast	with	the	desirable	outcomes.		
From	 an	 economic	 perspective,	 markets	 which	 operate	 free	 from	 distortion	 are	 an	
obvious	objective.	As	a	consequence,	price	volatility	can	be	seen	as	a	negative	impact	of	
distortive	business	or	investor	behaviour.	With	a	notion	of	“impact”	that	limits	itself	to	
functioning	markets,	there	is	however	hardly	any	room	left	for	other	criteria	such	as	for	
instance	supporting	small	scale	farmers.	
In	contrast	 to	 this	view,	a	notion	of	 impact	which	 is	based	on	substantial	 (rather	 than	
procedural	 or	 economic)	 values	 would	 not	 necessarily	 consider	 market	 failure	 as	
negative.	 In	 fact	 it	 would	 apply	 a	 different	 approach	 by	 first	 defining	 the	 values	 that	
warrant	 protection	 such	 as	 food	 security	 for	 everyone.	 From	 a	 business	 and	 investor	
perspective,	 the	 question	 then	 arises	 how	 far	 their	 responsibility	 for	 protecting	 such	
values	can	and	should	go.		
This	question	has	been	discussed	extensively,	every	time	the	UN	would	explore	avenues	
to	 hold	 business	 responsible	 for	 human	 rights	 violations.	 In	 attempt	 to	 overcome	 the	
dichotomy	between	relatively	clear‐cut	ideas	of	what	contributing	to	market	failures	by	
business	may	entail	and	the	open	notion	of	human	rights	responsibility,	the	concept	of	
“sphere	of	influence”	was	seen	as	a	potential	solution.	The	2003	Draft	Norms	stated	that	
businesses	 should	 only	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 human	 rights	 violations	 within	 their	
sphere	 of	 influence. 51 	Applied	 to	 food	 security,	 it	 seems	 difficult	 to	 establish	
responsibility	of	a	specific	business	actor	given	that	it	is	mostly	not	a	single	activity	but	
rather	a	combination	of	actions	that	lead	to	negative	impacts	on	food	security.	Moreover,	
with	 a	 view	 to	 the	 complex	 supply	 chain	 in	 international	 investment	 and	 particularly	
derivatives,	establishing	a	causal	relationship	between	business	behaviour	and	negative	
impacts	on	food	security	is	hardly	possible.	Measures	such	as	the	regulatory	proposals	
for	commodity	derivatives	suggested	by	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	right	to	food	and	
partially	 included	 in	 the	 Dodd‐Frank	 Act	 as	 well	 as	 the	 new	 European	 OTC	 Market	
																																																								
51		 Above,	fn	48.			
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Reform,52	will	 therefore	 not	 be	 able	 to	 specifically	 enhance	 responsible	 business	
behaviour	but	rather	establish	general	trading	rules.	The	question	thus	remains	how	to	
address	the	perceived	risk	of	business	negatively	affecting	food	security.	
b) Protect,	respect	and	remedy	framework	
None	 of	 the	 afore	 mentioned	 public	 policy	 documents	 addresses	 the	 new	 Protect,	
Respect	and	Remedy	framework	as	one	of	the	most	important	recent	developments	with	
regard	 to	 business	 activities	 and	 human	 rights.	 Given	 that	 their	 declared	 aim	 is	 to	
enhance	 standards	 and	 practices	 with	 regard	 to	 business	 and	 human	 rights	 so	 as	 to	
achieve	 tangible	 results	 for	 affected	 individuals	 and	 communities,	 and	 thereby	 also	
contribute	 to	 a	 socially	 sustainable	 globalization	 they	 would	 seem	 a	 natural	
complementary	element	of	especially	G‐20	statements.		
The	key	elements	of	the	“Protect,	Respect	and	Remedy”	framework	can	be	summarized	
as	the	recognition	and	affirmation	of:	
1.	 The	 legal	 duty	 of	 States	 to	 actively	 protect	 human	 rights	 not	 only	 from	 state	
intervention	but	also	from	private	actors,	including	business	enterprises;	
2.	 The	corporate	responsibility	to	respect	human	rights:	This	essentially	means	that,	in	
addition	 to	 compliance	 with	 applicable	 national	 legislation,	 business	 enterprises	
should	act	with	due	diligence	to	avoid	interfering	with	the	exercise	of	human	rights,	
and	to	address	adverse	human	rights	impacts	of	their	business	operations;		
3.	 The	need	 for	appropriate	and	effective	 judicial	and	non‐judicial	 remedies	 in	case	of	
human	rights	violations	(states)	or	adverse	human	rights	impacts	(companies).	
Each	 of	 these	 three	pillars	 is	 an	 essential	 component	 in	 an	 inter‐related	 and	dynamic	
system	of	preventative	and	remedial	measures.	With	regard	to	 food	security,	 the	main	
focus	has	so	far	been	on	the	state	duty	to	protect	with	measures	such	as	the	Seoul	Action	
																																																								
52		 European	Parliament	legislative	resolution	of	29	March	2012	on	the	proposal	for	a	regulation	of	the	
European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	over	the	counter	(OTC)	derivatives,	central	counterparties	
and	trade	repositories	(COM(2010)0484	–	C7‐0265/2010	–	2010/0250(COD)).	
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Plan	or	the	Dodd‐Frank	Act.	The	launch	of	AgResults53	marks	one	of	the	first	initiatives	to	
address	 corporate	 impact	 on	 food	 security.	 It	 does	 however	 not	 refer	 to	 corporate	
responsibility	but	applies	an	incentive‐based	economic	approach.		
c) The	Corporate	Responsibility	to	Respect	Human	Rights	
While	 national	 legislations	 may	 impose	 corresponding	 obligations	 on	 companies	
operating	within	their	jurisdiction,	as	a	matter	of	international	law,	business	enterprises	
have	no	direct	legal	obligation	to	comply	with	human	rights.	Strictly	speaking,	therefore,	
the	 corporate	 responsibility	 to	 respect	 human	 rights	 is	 not	 a	 legal	 obligation	 under	
international	 law,	 but	 rather	 corresponds	 to	 a	 basic	 societal	 expectation	 as	 to	 the	
conduct	 of	 business	 enterprises	 and	 ethical	 corporate	 behaviour.	 Nevertheless,	
companies	 are	 expected	 to	 respect	 human	 rights	 regardless	 of	 whether	 they	 are	
embedded	in	the	legal	system	of	the	country	where	they	operate.	Even	in	the	absence	of	
binding	human	rights	obligations	complicity	in	gross	human	rights	abuses	may	result	in	
legal	 liability	 under	 extraterritorial	 civil	 jurisdiction	 such	 as	 the	US	Alien	 Tort	 Claims	
Act.54	The	 General	 Principles	 therefore	 advise	 to	 address	 human	 rights	 as	 an	 issue	 of	
legal	compliance.	55		
A	 risk‐based	 approach	 to	 address	human	 rights	 is	 not	 completely	new	 for	 the	private	
sector.	With	 regard	 to	 financial	 institutions,	 the	 Basel	 II	 Framework	 already	 required	
financial	 institutions	 to	 include	 legal	 risks	 such	 as	 liability	 claims	 in	 their	 risk	
assessment. F56	Still,	 for	most	 businesses,	 systematically	 assessing	 human	 rights‐related	
risks	is	to	a	large	extent	unknown	territory.	
																																																								
53		 Above	p.	7	et	seq.	
54		 At	the	time	of	this	writing,	the	US	Supreme	Court	is	considering	a	complaint	which	challenges	the	
application	of	the	ATCA	to	corporations:	Kiobel	v	Royal	Dutch	Petroleum	et	al,	10‐1491,	Supreme	
Court	order	in	pending	case,	5	March	2012.			
55	 General	Principles	(fn	6),	no.	23.	
56		 Basel	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision	(BCBS),	International	Convergence	of	Capital	Measurement	
and	Capital	Standards,	revised	framework,	consolidated	version,	Basel	June	2006,	para.	115	(Basel	II).	
This	definition	is	not	affected	by	the	new	Basel	III	framework:	Revisions	to	the	Basel	II	market	risk	
framework,	updated	as	of	December	2010,	Basel,	Feburary	2011.	
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The	scope	of	corporate	responsibility	 to	respect	human	rights	has	been	at	 the	heart	of	
the	debate.	In	order	to	be	operational	in	a	business	context,	requirements	need	to	be	as	
specific	 as	 possible	 (“what	 is	 required”).	 In	 essence,	 the	 corporate	 responsibility	 to	
respect	human	rights	means	that	companies	should	avoid	interfering	with	the	exercise	
of	human	rights	and	address	adverse	human	rights	impacts	of	their	business	operations.	
In	 addition,	 the	 substantial	 scope	 of	 corporate	 responsibility	 needs	 to	 be	 defined.	
According	to	the	Guiding	Principles,	the	notion	of	human	rights	includes,	as	a	minimum,	
the	International	Bill	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR,	ICCPR,	ICECSR)	and	the	ILO‐Declaration	
on	Fundamental	Principles	and	Rights	at	Work.F57F.		
The	 Guiding	 Principles	 are	 applicable	 to	 all	 business	 enterprises,	 therefore	 all	
businesses	 have	 the	 responsibility	 to	 respect	 human	 rights,	 regardless	 of	 their	 size,	
sectoral	activity,	operational	context,	ownership	and	structure.58F		
Finally,	 in	 clear	 departure	 from	 earlier	 “sphere	 of	 influence”	 concepts,	 business	
responsibility	to	respect	human	rights	not	only	refers	to	their	own	activities,	but	extends	
also	to	adverse	human	rights	impacts	directly	linked	to	their	operations	or	products	or	to	
services	by	their	business	relationships.F59F	This	is	of	particular	relevance	in	the	context	of	
food	security,	given	the	long	and	complex	supply	chain.60		
The	 Guiding	 Principles	 do	 not	 provide	 substantial	 requirements	 for	 businesses	 but	
instead	 focus	on	process:	 In	order	 to	 implement	 their	responsibility	 to	respect	human	
rights	 in	 operational	 practice,	 business	 enterprises	 should	 establish	 the	 following	
policies,	processes	and	mechanisms:		
 A	human	rights	policy;	
 A	human	rights	due‐diligence	process;	
 A	grievance	and	remediation	mechanism.61	
																																																								
57		 General	Principles	(fn	6),	no.	12.	
58		 General	Principles	(fn	6),	no.	14.	
59		 General	Principles	(fn	6),	nos.	11	and	13.	
60		 Maloni/Brown	(fn	4).	
61		 General	Principles	(fn	6),	no.	15.	
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3. Impact	assessment	and	due	diligence	
The	purpose	of	the	human	rights	due‐diligence	process	as	an	element	of	the	corporate	
responsibility	 to	 respect	 is	 to	 identify,	 prevent,	 mitigate,	 and	 address	 actual	 and	
potential	human	rights	 impacts	 in	operational	practice.	Due	diligence	 is	understood	as	
not	a	one‐time	assessment,	but	a	continuous	process	taking	into	account	that,	over	time,	
human	 rights	 risks	 may	 evolve	 along	 with	 a	 company’s	 operations	 and	 business	
environment.62	
In	 contrast	 to	 earlier	 discussions	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Draft	 Norms,63	the	 scope	 of	 a	
human	rights	due	diligence	process	is	not	delimited	by	a	fixed	“sphere	of	influence”	but,	
rather,	 depends	 on	 the	 potential	 and	 actual	 human	 rights	 impacts	 resulting	 from	 (i.e.	
directly	or	 indirectly	 caused	by)	 a	 company’s	business	 activities	 and	 the	 relationships	
connected	to	those	activities.64	Thus,	human	rights	due	diligence	processes	should	cover	
adverse	human	rights	 impacts	that	the	business	enterprise	may	cause	or	contribute	to	
through	its	own	activities,	or	which	may	be	directly	linked	to	its	operations,	products	or	
services	by	its	business	relationships.65	Applied	to	food	security,	business	actors	such	as	
banks	 are	 required	 to	 assess	 their	 own	 activities’	 impacts	 as	well	 as	 actions	 by	 their	
business	 partners.	 In	 particular,	 a	 company’s	 due‐diligence	 process	 should	 avoid	
complicity	 in	human	rights	abuses	committed	by	 third	parties,	whether	States	or	non‐
state	actors.	In	essence,	complicity	denotes	that	a	company	knew	or	should	have	known	
(i.e.	 could	 reasonably	 be	 expected	 to	 know)	 that	 its	 activities	 or	 omissions	 would	
contribute	 to	 human	 rights	 abuses.66	The	 complexity	 and	 design	 of	 the	 due	 diligence	
process	will	vary	with	factors	such	as	the	size	of	the	business	enterprise,	the	severity	of	
potential	 human	 rights	 impacts,	 and	 the	nature	 and	 context	 of	 its	 operations.67	In	 any	
case,	 however,	 a	 successful	 due	 diligence	 process	 should	 involve	 the	 following	
indispensable	components:	Human	rights	 impact	assessment,	effective	 integration	and	
																																																								
62		 General	Principles	(fn	6),	no.	17.	
63		 Above	fn	48.	
64		 PRR,	§	72.	
65		 Guiding	Principles	(fn	6),	no.	17.	
66		 Protect,	Respect	and	Remedy	Framework	(note	6),	para.	79.	
67		 General	Principles	(fn	6),	no.	17.	
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appropriate	 action,	 tracking	 of	 response	 effectiveness,	 internal	 and	 external	 response	
communication.	 Operationalizing	 these	 principles	 requires	 a	 clear	 vision	 of	 what	 the	
different	standards	entail.68	
In	 December	 2011,	 The	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 the	 Right	 to	 Food,	 Olivier	 de	 Schutter	
submitted	 “Guiding	 principles	 on	 human	 rights	 impact	 assessments	 of	 trade	 and	
investment	 agreements”	 to	 the	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Council.69	The	 guiding	 principles	
address	 states	 but	 include	 some	 reference	with	 regard	 to	 business	 activities.	 Guiding	
principle	2	states:	
“States	must	ensure	that	the	conclusion	of	any	trade	or	investment	agreement	does	
not	 impose	 obligations	 inconsistent	 with	 their	 pre‐existing	 international	 treaty	
obligations,	including	those	to	respect,	protect	and	fulfil	human	rights.”		
In	the	commentary,	de	Schutter	elaborates	that	the	primary	responsibility	is	on	states:	
“Second,	States	should	protect	human	rights.	They	must	therefore	ensure	that	they	
will	 not	 be	 precluded	 from	 the	 possibility	 of	 controlling	 private	 actors	 whose	
conduct	may	lead	to	violating	the	human	rights	of	others,	for	example	as	a	result	of	
an	 excessively	 high	 level	 of	 protection	 of	 foreign	 investors	 established	 on	 their	
territory	 or	 because	 of	 a	 broad	 understanding	 of	 the	 prohibition	 of	 imposing	
performance	requirements	on	such	investors.”70	
In	an	earlier	report	to	the	UN	Human	Rights	Council	de	Schutter	addressed	one	specific	
aspect	of	business	activities	with	a	potentially	negative	impact	on	food	security:	contract	
and	large	scale	farming.71	The	report	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	in	order	to	foster	
food	 security	 small	 scale	 farming	 needs	 to	 be	 supported.	 Again,	 the	 primary	
responsibility	 to	 reach	 this	 goal	 –	 which	 is	 not	 undisputed	 among	 economists	 and	
agricultural	scientists	–	is	on	states.		
																																																								
68		 For	a	critical	view	with	regard	to	the	current	development	of	operationalization	Rob	Gray,	Sue	Gray,	
Accountability	and	human	rights:	A	tentative	exploration	and	a	commentary,	Critical	Perspectives	on	
Accounting	22	(2011)	781–	789.	
69		 Guiding	principles	on	human	rights	impact	assessments	of	trade	and	investment	agreements,	
19	December	2011,	A/HRC/19/59/Add.5.	
70		 Guiding	principles	on	human	rights	impact	assessment	(fn	69),	para.	2.3.	
71		 Above	fn	28.	
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At	the	same	time,	the	private	sector	is	in	many	areas	redefining	its	role	to	be	more	that	
of	a	partner	of	the	state	with	some	common	development	objectives.72	The	motivations	
for	engaging	 in	 such	a	partnership	are	however	different	 for	 the	state	and	 the	private	
sector.73	Research	on	what	the	key	drivers	for	business	behavior	are	is	still	in	its	infancy.	
First	 results	 indicate	 that	 depending	 on	 the	 circumstances	 CSR	 and	 human	 rights	
policies	 may	 be	 a	 reaction	 to	 consumer	 preferences,	 to	 a	 perceived	 lack	 in	 (state)	
regulation,	 especially	 in	 countries	 with	 weak	 governance	 or	 a	 means	 to	 overcome	
misaligned	 interests	 between	 individuals	 and	 public	 policies.	 An	 example	 for	 a	 far	
reaching	 business	 initiative	 is	 the	 Nestlé	 Cocoa	 Plan74	which	 inter	 alia	 includes	 the	
training	 of	 farmers	 and	 improving	 social	 conditions	 in	 cocoa‐growing	 areas.	 Nestlé	
describes	its	motivation	as	follows:	
“To	 enhance	 our	 ability	 to	 continue	 to	 do	 business	 in	 the	 future,	 make	 better	
quality	 chocolate	 and	 satisfy	 consumer	 preference,	 it	 is	 vital	 that	we	 ensure	 the	
wellbeing	of	the	cocoa	farmers	that	supply	us	and	the	communities	in	which	they	
live.”		
Nestlé’s	“create	shared	value”	policy	was	partially	developed	as	a	reply	to	consumer	and	
regulatory	 initiatives	 such	 as	 the	 Harkin	 Engel	 proposal	 in	 the	 United	 States75	or	
consumer	 movements	 calling	 for	 sustainable	 production.	 In	 other	 words,	 business	
initiatives	may	not	necessarily	be	motivated	by	human	rights	considerations	about	food	
																																																								
72		 Some	case	studies	can	be	found	in	Surabhi	Chophra,	The	Right	to	Food	and	Water:	Dependencies	and	
Dilemmas,	Institute	for	Human	Rights	and	Business,	London	2010.	Available	at	
http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Right_to_Food_and_Water_Dependencies_and_Dilemmas.pdf	(accessed	
19	June	2012).	
73		 David	A.	Waldman,	Donald	S.	Siegel,	Mansour	Javidan,	Components	of	CEO	Transformational	
Leadership	and	Corporate	Social	Responsibility,	Journal	of	Management	Studies	43	(2006)	1703–1725;	
Christian	Voegtlin,	Moritz	Patzer,	Andreas	Georg	Scherer,	Responsible	Leadership	in	Global	Business:	A	
New	Approach	to	Leadership	and	Its	Multi‐Level	Outcomes,	Journal	of	Business	Ethics	105	(2012),	1‐
16.	
74		 Available	at	http://www.nestle.com/csv/ruraldevelopment/cocoa/Pages/cocoa.aspx	(accessed	
19	June	2012).	
75		 “Harkin‐Engel	Protocol”,	originally	initiated	with	HR	2330,	107th	Cong	(2001),	amended	by	H	amdt.	
142,	147	Cong	Rec	H3781‐83,	3786‐87	(daily	edtion	28	June	2001):	Protocol	for	the	Growing	and	
Processing	of	Cocoa	Beans	and	their	Derivative	Products	in	a	Manner	that	Complies	with	ILO	
Convention	182	Concerning	the	Prohibition	and	Immediate	action	for	the	Elimination	of	the	Worst	
Forms	of	Child	Labor.	Available	at	http://www.cocoainitiative.org/en/reports/harkin‐engel‐protocol	
(accessed	21	June	2012).	
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security	 but	 by	 responding	 to	 business	 necessities	 and	 by	 creating	 shared	 value.	
Therefore,	the	question	arises	whether	there	is	a	business	case	 for	the	private	sector	to	
contribute	to	food	security.	
4. Food	security	as	opportunity	and	risk	for	business	
a) The	business	case	for	human	rights:	fact	or	fiction?	
“Human	 rights	 compliance	 is	 good	 for	 business”.	 Recent	 research	 indicates	 a	 positive	
correlation	 between	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 and	 firm	 value	 for	 firms	 in	
controversial	 industries.76	Yet,	 despite	 new	 developments	 such	 as	 the	 shared	 value	
concept	 it	 is	 still	 difficult	 to	 scientifically	prove	 the	 long	 sought‐for	 “business	 case	 for	
human	rights”.77		
With	 its	 assumption	 that	 it	 is	 societal	 needs	 not	 only	 economic	 needs	 that	 define	
markets,	 the	Shared	Value	Approach,	a	 concept	developed	by	Porter	 and	Kramer,	 joins	
other	 conceptual	 initiatives	 which	 apply	 a	 holistic	 approach	 to	 defining	 both	 market	
outcomes	and	costs.	Applied	to	food	security,	a	violation	for	instance	by	water	pollution	
would	not	be	addressed	as	a	human	rights	violations	per	se	but	as	an	externality	 that	
creates	costs	for	the	society	while	at	the	same	time	also	leading	to	internal	costs	to	the	
company	 involved	 due	 to	 wasted	 resources,	 negative	 publicity	 etc.78	As	 a	 result,	 the	
proponents	of	this	approach	abandon	the	in	their	view	“old,	narrow	view	of	capitalism”	
according	to	which	“business	contributes	to	society	by	making	a	profit,	which	supports	
employment,	 wages,	 purchases,	 investment	 and	 taxes.” 79 	From	 a	 human	 rights	
perspective,	establishing	a	 link	between	 the	use	of	 freedom	of	economic	activities	and	
the	human	rights	of	people	affected	by	economic	activities	 is	nothing	new.	Other	 than	
suggested	 by	 proponents	 of	 the	 shared	 value	 approach,	 modern	 conceptions	 of	
corporate	 social	 responsibility	 and	 sustainability	 are	 already	 built	 precisely	 on	 this	
																																																								
76		 Ye	Cai,	Hoje	Jo,	Carrie	Pan,	Doing	Well	While	Doing	Bad?	CSR	in	Controversial	Industry	Sectors,	Journal	
of	Business	Ethics	108	(2012),	467‐489.	
77		 Manuela	Weber,	The	business	case	for	corporate	social	responsibility:	A	company‐level	measurement	
approach	for	CSR,	European	Management	Journal	26	(2008),	247‐261.	
78		 Porter/Kramer	2011	(fn	44),	65.	
79		 Porter/Kramer	2011	(fn	44),	66.	
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insight.	In	fact,	the	relationship	between	economic	welfare,	human	rights	and	peace	can	
be	traced	back	all	the	way	to	the	Atlantic	Charter	of	1941.80		
According	 to	 Porter	 and	 Kramer,	 Shared	 Value	 is	 a	 clear	 departure	 from	 any	 CSR	
concept.	However,	with	its	clear	stance	that	Shared	Value	is	not	about	redistribution	but	
rather	“expanding	the	overall	amount	of	value	created”81,	 the	individual	aspect	of	 food	
security	which	requires	the	fulfilment	of	basic	requirements	for	every	single	individual	is	
not	 addressed.	 This	 becomes	 most	 striking	 when	 Porter	 and	 Kramer	 argue	 that	 fair	
trade	understood	as	increasing	the	proportion	of	revenue	that	goes	to	poor	farmers	by	
paying	 them	higher	prices	 for	 the	 same	 crops	has	 a	distributive	 effect	 on	 the	 affected	
farmers	while	 the	 Shared	Value	 approach	would	 lead	 to	 a	 “bigger	 pie	 of	 revenue	 and	
profits	that	benefits	both	 farmers	and	the	companies	that	buy	 from	them”	they	do	not	
address	the	fact,	that	very	poor	farmers	may	not	be	able	to	participate	in	these	benefits.	
Their	 example	 of	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 according	 to	 which	 fair	 trade	 can	 increase	 farmers’	
incomes	 by	 10%	 to	 20%	while	 shared	 value	 investments	 can	 raise	 their	 incomes	 by	
more	than	300%,	from	a	food	security	perspective	misses	the	point.	Implementing	food	
security	is	not	only	about	raising	average	income	and	overall	access	to	food	but	includes	
safeguards	to	make	sure	that	every	individual	can	enjoy	his	or	her	right	to	food.	The	two	
concepts	of	human	rights	based	CSR	on	the	one	hand	and	Shared	Value	on	the	other	are	
therefore	not	incompatible	but	based	on	different	conceptual	approaches.	It	is	therefore	
interesting	to	note	that	in	a	reply	to	a	related	criticism	by	John	Elkington,	Mark	Kramer	
conceded	that	Shared	Value	and	CSR	must	not	be	seen	as	mutually	exclusive	but	rather	
as	complementary	strategies.82		
																																																								
80		 Reprinted	in:	Samuel	Irving	Rosenman	(ed),	The	Public	Papers	and	Addresses	of	Franklin	D	Roosevelt,	
New	York	1938,	314	
81		 Porter/Kramer	2011	(fn	44),	65.	
82		 The	controversy	took	place	in	the	context	of	an	onine	debate	with	the	Guardian,	available	at:	
http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable‐business/shared‐value‐how‐corporations‐profit‐social‐
problems	(accessed	20	June	2012).	
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b) Food	security	as	an	element	of	risk	management	
Since	the	business	case	argument	cannot	be	generally	applied	to	supporting	compliance	
with	food	security	by	the	business	sector,	an	approach	which	applies	risk	management	
theories	seems	to	be	more	promising	in	order	to	raise	business	awareness.		
How	does	food	security	become	an	issue	in	a	business	context?	One	avenue	is	a	specific	
incident	 that	 sparks	a	public	discussion	 in	which	NGOs	may	play	an	 important	 role.	A	
recent	 example	 is	 a	 campaign	 against	 several	 financial	 institutions	 labelling	 them	
“Hunger‐Makers”	because	of	their	investment	policies.83	A	few	months	after	the	launch	
of	the	campaign,	one	of	the	targeted	institutions,	Deutsche	Bank	announced	that	“recent	
debate	on	the	impact	of	commodity	speculation	has	prompted	Deutsche	Bank	to	reflect	
on	its	role	in	solving	global	hunger”.84The	internal	debate	was	conducted	in	the	broader	
framework	of	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	and	Climate	Change.	From	an	operational	
perspective,	 rather	 than	 discussing	 human	 rights	 implications	 of	 activities	 from	 a	
general	ethical	view,	it	is	more	likely	that	negative	human	rights	impacts	will	be	framed	
as	risks.			
There	 is	a	variety	of	risks	 for	a	company	which	may	occur	because	of	 its	perceived	or	
alleged	involvement	in	violating	food	security.		
Legal	 risks	 may	 include	 investigations,	 litigation	 or	 prosecution	 under	 foreign	 or	
domestic	 national	 law;	 international	 or	 national	 prosecution	 of	 key	 personnel;	
withdrawal	 of	 operating	 licenses;	 stricter	 regulation;	 adverse	 shareholder	 action;	
divestment	 laws.	 Unlike	 reputational	 risks,	 legal	 risks	 are	 included	 in	 the	 Basel	 II	
framework	 and	 need	 to	 be	 assessed.85	Recent	 examples	 include	 liability	 under	 the	 US	
Alien	Tort	Claims	Act	(ATCA)	or	the	US	Sudanese	divestment	law.	In	addition,	depending	
																																																								
83		 Foodwatch,	The	Hunger‐Makers.	How	Deutsche	Bank,	Goldman	Sachs	and	other	Financial	Institutions	
are	Speculating	with	Food	at	the	Expense	of	Poorest,	Berlin	2011,	by	Harald	Schumann,	available	at	
http://foodwatch.de/e10/e45260/e45263	(accessed	on	20	June	2012).	
84		 Statement	of	4	May	2012,	available	at	<http://www.banking‐on‐
green.com/en/content/our_sustainability_approach/agriculture_4461.html>	(accessed	on	20	June	
2012).	
85	 See	also	BCBS,	Principles	for	enhancing	corporate	governance,	Basel	October	2010.	
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on	 jurisdiction,	 contributing	 to	 a	 human	 rights	 violation	 may	 trigger	 criminal	
responsibility	of	the	management.86	
Reputational	 risks	relate	 to	negative	media	coverage,	protests	by	population	segments	
or	 official	 authorities;	 divestment	 campaigns).	 Due	 to	 modern	 communications	
technologies	 and	 social	media	 such	 as	 facebook,	 potential	 human	 rights	 problems	 are	
easily	made	public	and	public	pressure	builds	fast.			
Operational	risks	occur	when	projects	are	delayed,	business	relations	terminated	or	key	
personnel	are	lost.	
Finally,	 controversies	 about	 alleged	 human	 rights	 violations	may	 invoke	 security	risks	
such	as	aggressive	or	terrorist	threats	and	action,	a	need	to	evacuate	areas,	suspension	
or	termination	of	business	operations).	
VI. Towards	an	integrated	three‐dimensional	approach	to	food	security	
This	paper	has	outlined	several	deficits	that	hinder	a	comprehensive	implementation	of	
food	security	by	all	involved	actors,	i.e.	at	the	micro‐,	meso‐	and	macro‐level.	In	order	to	
overcome	these	obstacles,	the	following	three	proposals	are	submitted:	
1. Need	for	analysing	motivation	and	dynamics	at	the	meso‐	(business‐)	level	
This	 paper	 shows	 that	 current	 initiatives	 to	 improve	 food	 security	 such	 as	 the	 Seoul	
Action	Plan	or	proposals	to	revise	the	WTO	Agreement	on	Agriculture	focus	on	the	state	
duty	to	protect	the	right	to	food.	Only	rarely	is	the	essential	role	that	business	activities	
can	 play	 in	 this	 regard	 addressed.	 A	 recent	 example	 is	 AgResults	 which	 is	 based	 on	
common	insights	on	business	incentives	but	still	does	not	 include	any	reference	to	the	
work	 of	 the	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 council	 and	 especially	 the	 new	 Protect,	 Respect	 and	
Remedy	 Framework.	While	 a	 lot	 of	 research	 has	 been	 done	 to	 better	 understand	 and	
conceptualize	 the	 dynamics	 between	 individuals	 as	 right‐holders	 and	 states	 as	 duty‐
bearers	of	the	right	to	food	security,	little	do	we	know	about	the	motivation	that	triggers	
																																																								
86	 Complaint	of	asbestos	victims	against	two	former	board	members	of	their	employer	Eternit	spa	in	
Italy,	decision	by	the	Tribunale	di	Torino	of	13	February	2012.	Available	at	http://www.diario‐
prevenzione.it/docbiblio/sentenza_eternit.pdf	(accessed	21	June	2012).	
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the	activities	of	businesses	as	key	actors	in	the	food	supply	chain.	New	research	suggests	
that	the	institutional	dynamics	in	which	businesses	act	play	an	important	role	in	shaping	
motivation	and	policy‐making.87		
2. Improving	 regulatory	 procedure:	Mainstreaming	 the	 Protect,	 Respect	 and	
Remedy	Framework	into	business‐related	policies	and	regulations		
With	the	unanimous	adoption	of	the	Protect,	Respect	and	Remedy	Framework	and	the	
respective	 Guiding	 Principles	 by	 the	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Council,	 mainstreaming	 them	
into	 business‐related	 activities	 of	 all	 stakeholders	 is	 a	 priority.	 This	 has	 been	
acknowledged	 by	 the	 UN	 Working	 Group	 on	 human	 rights	 and	 transnational	
corporations	 in	 its	 first	 report	 to	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Council88	and	 further	 been	
elaborated	on	in	its	working	methods:		
“[…]	he	Working	Group’s	activities	will	focus	on		
Embedding	the	Guiding	Principles	into	global	governance,	including	as	a	means	of	
enhancing	accountability.	
Ensuring	 that	 the	Guiding	Principles	 are	 fully	 embedded	 into	 the	work	 of	
key	global	and	regional	institutions	and	mechanisms,	and	ensuring	further	
global	convergence	around	the	Guiding	Principles	and	synergies	with	other	
actors	and	processes	in	the	area	of	business	and	human	rights.”89	
Including	these	principles	in	economic	institutions	will	require	particular	efforts	and	a	
clear	mainstreaming	concept.	
																																																								
87		 Kunal	Basu,	Guidio	Palazzo,	Corporate	Social	Responsibility:	A	Process	Model	of	Sensemaking,	Academy	
of	Management	Review,	33	(2008),	122–136;	
88		 Report	of	the	Working	Group	on	the	issue	of	human	rights	and	transnational	corporations	and	other	
business	enterprises,	10	April	2012,	A/HRC/20/29,	para.	75.	
89		 Working	Group	on	the	issue	of	human	rights	and	transnational	corporations	and	other	business	
enterprises,	Methods	of	work,	available	at	:	
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx	(accessed	20	June	2012).		
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3. Improving	 regulatory	 substance:	 Include	 findings	 from	meso‐level	analysis	
in	substance	of	regulations		
Apart	 from	 enhancing	 research	 regarding	 the	 meso‐level,	 regulatory	 improvements	 at	
the	macro‐level	are	necessary.	As	indicated,	several	regulatory	initiatives	were	launched	
with	a	view	to	 increase	 food	security.	While	 these	 instruments	 include	state	of	 the	art	
scientific	findings	from	agricultural	and	economic	research	there	is	no	reference	to	new	
regulatory	 concepts	 as	 contained	 in	 the	UN	Protect,	Respect	 and	Remedy	Framework.	
Instead,	the	old	mantra	of	the	strict	dichotomy	between	private,	voluntary	standards	on	
the	one	and	state‐led	binding	hard	 law	on	the	other	hand	 is	repeated.	This	 is	not	only	
deplorable	 from	 a	 scholarly	 point	 of	 view	 but	 also	 particularly	 worrisome	 because	 it	
leads	 to	 initiatives	 such	 as	 the	 European	 “Law	 without	 borders”	 campaign	 by	 which	
NGOs	urge	states	to	introduce	binding	regulation	to	holding	companies	responsible	and	
take	 them	 to	 court	 in	 case	 of	 non‐compliance	 with	 human	 rights.90	Such	 an	 initiative	
despite	 its	 noble	 cause	 neglects	 the	 fundamental	 underpinnings	 of	 how	 business	
decisions	 and	policies	 are	 shaped.	 It	 lies	 in	 the	nature	of	 human	 rights	 and	 especially	
complex	 social	 right	 such	 as	 food	 security	 that	 they	 are	 only	 partially	 suited	 for	 a	
comprehensive	 regulatory	 coverage.	 Law‐making	 is	 a	 slow	process	 and	 rarely	 able	 to	
catch	up	with	innovative	technological	developments	in	agriculture	or	financial	industry	
(food	derivatives).	If	food	security	is	to	be	promoted	efficiently,	it	will	therefore	depend	
on	 businesses	 going	 beyond	 the	 call	 of	 legal	 duties	 and	 engage	 in	 “voluntary”	
commitments.	Obviously,	incentives,	whether	risk‐	or	profit‐induced,	play	an	important	
role	 in	shaping	such	commitments.	 In	 this	 light,	 it	 is	questionable	whether	well‐meant	
proposals	 such	 as	 a	 mandatory	 obligation	 for	 financial	 institutions	 to	 report	 on	 the	
specific	 human	 rights	 responsibilities	 they	 (voluntarily)	 committed	 to	 may	 in	 fact	 be	
counterproductive.	 Based	 on	 a	 business	 rationale,	 a	 company	may	 think	 twice	 about	
voluntarily	 subscribing	 to	 human	 rights	 standards	 if	 such	 a	 commitment	may	 induce	
legal	liability	and	therefore	contain	risks.91		
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In	sum,	taking	into	account	new	developments	and	research	on	how	the	private	sector	
interacts	with	individuals	and	the	public	requires	a	departure	from	traditional	state‐led	
only	 rule‐making	 procedures.	 Only	 then	will	 the	 regulatory	 environment	 be	 ready	 to	
address	the	many	challenges	for	food	security	in	the	21st	century.	
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(accessed	20	June	2012).	
